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Patronage Driven Corruption Undermining
the Fight against Poverty in Uganda
Mbabazi Godfrey and Pyeong Jun Yu
Yonsei University Wonju Campus, Korea
Abstract: Uganda has been a den of corruption for a long time, a “disease” that has eaten up
the entire society. Surprisingly or not, the Ugandan political machine has ensured that this
practice thrives to benefit its interests at the expense of the majority poor. This study reveals that
Uganda’s patronage and corruption quandary emanated from the British Colonial
administrative system which was based on using a section of local people to rule over the rest
and consequently rewarded them for supporting their policies and interests. With the intentioned
absence of democratic rule, institutions that could condemn, exert public control and demand
accountability from public officials never developed. As a result, evidence shows that despite
Uganda’s strong anti-corruption framework, patronage and corruption have continued to thrive
largely due to the failure of anti-corruption institutions to enforce the anti-corruption framework
making the fight against corruption a losing battle.
Keywords: Colonial legacy, patronage, weak institutions, corruption, poverty

Introduction
Corruption presents itself in a variety of forms and though more prevalent in developing
countries it surely takes a good share of developed counties’ budgets as well. This has led
countries and international organizations to theorize and formulate different kinds of response
scenarios inform of measures to curb this ever present malady. It’s nearly impossible that one
looks at a newspaper without stories on corruption scandals around the world, an indication that
corruption isn’t a problem for a select few but for all countries around the world.
As for developing countries, present-day scholars have gone ahead to create connections
between colonialism and the current state of affairs prevailing in different countries. In this line
of analysis, a number of quantitative research both within and across nations, have related
colonial-era policies and institutions to post-independence variations in economic growth
(Englebert, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; 2002) and corruption, (Treiman,
2000). One strand of this literature indicates that Europeans adopted different colonization
policies with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans couldn’t settle due to
high mortality rates, the colonial administration established extractive institutions. Though a
number of studies about patronage have been done on Uganda (Titeca 2006; Mwenda and
Tangiri 2005; Maraka, 2009) patronage and donor reforms (Tangiri and Mwenda, 2011),
cronyism (Tangiri and Mwenda, 2001), none has addressed the dilemma of why despite the
presence of an excellent legal and institutional framework for anti-corruption in Uganda,
corruption keeps increasing. In this article, we address this predicament by showing the large
implementation gap causing the failure of anti-corruption efforts that undermine the fight against
54
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poverty to be a result of a complex relationship involving British colonial policies, patronage and
weak institutions.
We also examine the applicability colonial legacy perspective to Uganda’s context and
along the way answer the questions of whether or not patronage and corruption in Uganda
originated from the British colonial administration. Next we try to find out why the fight against
corruption in Uganda has failed?, lastly we also look at how the weakness of anti-corruption
institutions in the fight against corruption has affected poverty reduction efforts. In the following
sections, we take a look the definitions of corruption paving way for the analysis of the different
perspectives on corruption particularly, socio-cultural, economic and political perspectives. We
then look at the British colonial legacy and the origin of patronage in Uganda. Building on the
preceding section, we explore how political patronage and corruption exist in Uganda today.
Afterwards, we analyze why anti-corruption measures have failed by emphasizing the weakness
of institutions, and effects of corruption on government’s efforts to fight poverty respectively.
Lastly, we conclude and offer some recommendations. .
Conceptualizing Corruption
Most research done on corruption usually begins by not only stating what corruption is but by
also demonstrating how tough it is to assign a precise meaning to this concept. In the context of
developing countries, the World Bank has singled out Corruption as the biggest challenge to
economic and social development (World Bank, 1997). This however doesn’t mean that this
malady is absent in developed countries, corruption is seen to respect no society and transcends
boundaries of developed and underdeveloped countries as it does in democracies and
dictatorships (Lui, 2007). To democracies for instance, corruption strikes the basic principles on
which democracy rests particularly impartiality of institutions, and transparency than it does in
dictatorships. Therefore corruption is globally present and widely resented (Rothstein and
Teorell, 2008).
In light of the above, corruption has been commonly defined as “the abuse public power
for private gain” (Amundsen, Sissener, and Soreide, 2000). World Bank’s definition of
corruption takes a slightly different format as “the use of public office for private gain” (World
Bank, 1997). To Deflem, corruption is defined in reference to the illegal acts related to power
offices, institutions and other politically related spheres (Deflem, 1995). Yet Rothstein and
Teorell define corruption as “the violation of non-discrimination norms governing the behavior
of holders of public office that are motivated by private gain” (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). If
an analysis of most definitions of corruption is made, many illegal activities such as bribery,
extortion become either part of corruption or are understood as distinct from corruption. Thus,
the concept is broadly defined or sometimes not defined at all (Williams, 1981). All in all, this
study adopts Johnston’s definition which takes corruption to involve “the abuse of trust,
generally one involving public power, for private benefit which often, but by no means always,
comes inform of money” (Johnston, 2005, 11)
Perspectives on Corruption
The search for a clear understanding of corruption has led researchers to consider a broad range
of perspectives to unravel its causes. Here, we take a look at three perspectives; the social55
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cultural, economic, and political perspective to which we believe can highlight the intricacies of
Uganda’s corruption quandary, help trace its origin and causes, discover why efforts to fight it
have failed, and provide a basis for devising relevant measures of eliminating corruption.
Socio-cultural perspective
In the field of sociology, social problems are defined as “conditions growing out of
human interactions that are considered undesirable by a significant number of people who
believe they can be resolved through preventative or remedial action” (Merton and Nisbet 1961,
92). One of the classifications of social problems is from the socio-cultural perspective where
crime is categorized. Corruption is a crime against humanity since it deviates from the legally
accepted standards of society such as norms and rules. Where corruption exists, meaningful
development can hardly occur. Therefore it is a disintegrative social factor which often hinders
social, political and economic development of nations
Contextually, corruption is perceived differently depending on the differences in societal
norms (Bardham, 1997). This makes the generalization of measures to curb corruption
questionable since what constitutes an act of corruption in one country could be entirely
acceptable in another. Take for instance the culture of gift giving which to some countries is part
and partial of their life, does it qualify as corruption? Much as past literature has thrown a lot of
criticism at the culture of gift giving equating it to bribery and a justification for tolerating
corruption (Hope, 2000), perceiving this culture as act of corruption seems unfair to such
societies that have practiced it for centuries. In this respect, while the custom of gift giving on
one hand signifies the importance of social relations (Steidlmeier, 1999), on the other hand it is
an illegal exchange that goes against other society’s rules and regulations. Therefore, for clarity,
a lucid demarcation should be made on issues of culture and corruption in different societies if an
acceptable definition of corruption and its composition is to be reached.
Economic Perspective
The economic perspective on corruption tries to explain how economic factors impact the spread
of corruption and its effects on society. Economic theory on corruption such as public choice
argues that corruption just like rent seeking is a result of poorly channeled self-interest that seeks
to maximize at the expense of the public good (Mbaku, 1998) Taking for instance grand
corruption or even petty corruption in the civil service; these two can seriously hamper the
ability of the state to provide services and at the same time can act as an extra tax on citizens in
the process of accessing services.
Petty corruption in form of bribes by public officials has been justified in some circles as
a way through which public officials meet their cost of living due to low salaries earned from
government jobs (Pope, 2000). Yet Kaufmann in his “grease-the-wheels” argument asserts that,
“bribery can be an efficient way of getting around burdensome regulations and ineffective legal
systems” (Kaufmann (2011). This argument is however lacking especially if considered in the
public sector context where public goods are allocated irrespective of who is paying the highest
price. Indeed, Ades and Di Tella (1997), conclude that corruption acts mainly as “a sand-in-themachine”. Therefore to root out this justification in public office, civil service reforms including
increased pay and rotation of workers should be implemented in order to disrupt informal links
56
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from developing.
Furthermore, corruption has also been correlated with income inequality and poverty
since proceeds from corruption most likely accrue to the well-connected members in society who
happen to be the “haves” other than “the have-nots” (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002).
One of the major roles of government is to ensure equitable distribution of resources however;
corruption distorts this redistributive role of the state and ensures that better connected
individuals get opportunities to climb up the economic ladder (Tanzi, 1998). Accordingly,
Shleifer and Vishny argue that, to succeed in shifting away resources from productive activities
like education and heath which has a direct bearing on the life of the poor requires a high degree
of secrecy to keep the network intact and secure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In other words,
corruption is possible simply because those involved have protection and assurance.
Political Perspective
Citizens elect leaders with an understanding that they will take care of them. Most democratic
countries indeed fulfill this wish by providing for their citizens transparently and in the most
convenient ways. Similarly, La Porta et al, 1999), shares a related view that “good governments
contribute to success in economic development”, definitely with the intention of enhancing the
quality of life for their citizens. That said, Shleifer argues that government performance is
determined by political needs (Shleifer and vishny, 1993). Such needs are heavily reflected in the
kind of governance that exist in a particular context, consequently, its plausible to say that
different governance structures such as democracies and dictatorships have political needs
shaped by their beliefs and how they benefit politically.
On that basis therefore, political perspective on corruption normally takes the shape of
political patronage and corruption which varies with the type of political system in question. To
this end, the nature, scope, and potential of political corruption might take different forms in a
democracy compared to that in a dictatorship. Thus political corruption can reveal itself in a
variety of forms such as clientelism, patronage, nepotism, and so forth with a range of
characteristics (Bratsis, 2003). Political corruption indeed is a complex phenomenon and for its
terrorizing impact to be clearly understood, it is imperative that we find out why it is more
visible in some societies than others, its origins, and what majorly explain its existence. Overall,
institutions and policies are shaped by those in power to stay in power and amass resources (La
Porta et al, 1999). This perspective can closely be related to the situation in uganda as will
explained in the subsequent sections.
Methodology
The study uses a qualitative approach mainly a review of diferent literatures on colonialism,
patronage and corruption. In addition, both international organizations’ websites such as the
World Bank and IMF to mention but a few, and as well as instititution websites of agencies in
Uganda have been searched for information and possible data that has been used to illustrate how
Uganda rates in terms of crruption with other countries in africa.
Figure 1: A Framework for the study of patronage, corruption and the failure of ant-corruption
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Colonial legacy and the Origin of Patronage in Uganda
Before the arrival of the British imperialists, the area now known as Uganda was made up of
different Kingdoms that had different administrative structures and relationships based on trade
and military might (Ward, 1991). Notably among them were Buganda and Bunyoro Kingdoms.
The first signs of imperial aggression came with the arrival of protestant and catholic
missionaries in 1877 and 1879 representing the interests of Britain and France respectively. The
rivalry between the two Christian factions sooner than later exploded into war in 1892 of which
the Protestants with the help of the Imperial British East African Company came out victorious
(Ward, 1991).
Two years down the road, the British government formally declared a protectorate over
Uganda, and Christianity came to dominate the political arena of Buganda and Uganda later on.
The alliance between the British and Buganda led to the signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement
and the eventual extension of British rule to other parts of Uganda. Britain needed local
collaboration to make her occupation of Uganda effective and cheap and chose patronage as the
best way to deepen this new found relationship with Buganda. The Kingdom received big chunks
of land and its officials were given permission to collect taxes on behalf of the colonial
government (Moncrieffe, 2004). Buganda local chiefs became elevated to fill most of the
positions in the colonial administration (International Crisis Group, 2012), in addition to
becoming sub-imperialists in other parts of Uganda. This indirect system of using Buganda to
rule over other Ugandans became systematized later on as reflected in the appointment of
Ministers and majority public servants to image the tribe of the president at a time.
As per the categorization made by Acemoglu et al. (2001), Uganda was one of those
countries seen as unfit for British settlers which forced the colonial administration to concentrate
on putting up extractive institutions to aid in the drawing out of resources. The construction of
the Uganda railway to connect Uganda to the East Africa coast so as to fasten the movement of
both agricultural and natural resources such as cotton and copper was a clear testament to that
effect (Bamber, 2001). Alternatively, colonies that were found fit for European settlement,
received high numbers of European settlers who went ahead to demand institutions similar to
those in Europe to protect property rights, guard against government expropriations, rule of law
to mention but a few (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau,
2006). Consequently, political, social and administrative institutions that sprung up were heavily
reliant on, and meant to facilitate the interests of the British colonial administration.
According to Ruzindana, (1997, 134) the colonial period offered no possibility that the
58
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indigenous people employed in the public service, could be seriously involved in corruption
because major decisions were made by the colonial officials. Thus, through the indirect rule
policy that was based on coercion and subjugation of one tribe against others, there was no room
for democratic rule, and as result, institutions that could condemn, exert public control and
demand accountability from public officials never developed. Thus, the actions of the British to
distribute incentives based on who was loyal and supportive of their policies was clearly a
patronage strategy that later on became evident in Ugandan politics and administration.
Upon the attainment of independence in 1962, the elites who took over Uganda’s
administration inherited a colonial administrative system that used a mixture of favors and
excessive force to accomplish their own agendas. These elites abolished the independence
constitution resulting into the postponement of elections and out of this situation, “corruption
emerged reflecting not merely economic greed but also the realities of political survival since the
continued support of the rulers was based on patronage which could only be sustained by a
continuous flow of favors to one’s followers” (Ruzindana, 1997, 134). Thus, patronage politics
in Uganda- then and now- can been seen as a direct progeny of the British colonial system. It
was used then and is still being used to ensure that the interests of those in authority are served.
Patronage and Corruption in Uganda today
Museveni’s accession to power as the President of Uganda in 1986 was cherished and
indeed supported by many people both within and outside of Uganda. In his book, “What is
Africa’s problem”? Museveni concluded that Africa’s problem was leaders who overstayed in
power (Museveni, 1992). In his 28 year reign until now, Museveni undertook reforms as
prescribed by World Bank and IMF inform of structural adjustment programs at least until 1995.
This meant not only shifting key economic decisions from the state to the private sector but most
importantly, it was a restructuring of Uganda’s politics which had seen previous governments
use state control of the economy to build political support either through rewarding their
supporters or buying off potential opponents.
Between 1992 and 1995, his reforms aimed at reducing the size of government but back
tracked after 1996, as he entered a period of electoral politics. The president realized that to win
over an ethnically diverse population, he needed to accommodate the interests of powerful elites
and at the same time provide at least a minimum level of public goods for the masses.
Paradoxically, the interests of the powerful elites are in most cases inconsistent with those of
their constituents. Whereas the general population is more concerned with good roads, hospitals,
schools etc, the elites are more interested in private goods such as positions of power, high
paying jobs and opportunities for corruption (Johnston, 1997). Through these, Museveni has
created a political machine and with the help of the army, he seems destined for life presidency.
Considering the massive theft of state funds that has rocked the country recently in form
of corruption scandals involving powerful government officials on whom no action has been
taken, it is plausible to say that patronage and corruption have been well exercised in Uganda.
Since 2007, government has been involved in a number of high profile scandals and despite
compelling evidence presented against some of the ministers and ruling party officials, justice
has not been served due to political interference from the highest office. The failure of
responsible institutions to prosecute corrupt officials citing political interference has led majority
59
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of Ugandans to believe that through these scandals, the ruling party systematically secures funds
for its patronage network.
Table 1: Major patronage driven corruption Scandals
Corruption Scandals
Amount
Officials Implicated
CHOGM1 (2007)

$ 27 Million

Global Fund (2008)
Temangalo (2008)
National ID (2010)

$38 Million
$4.3 Million
$7.5 Million

Bicycle scam (2011)
Pensions (2012)
OPM2 (2012)

$1.7 Million
$66.7 Million
$19.7 Million

Former Vice-President Prof Gilbert Bukenya, Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi
Current Minister for ICT John Nasasira & his Deputy
Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa
Former Health Minister Jim Muhwezi and his
Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, & Businessman Amos Nzeyi
Former Minister for General Duties Kiddu Makubuya,
Former Internal Affairs Minister Kirunda Kivejinja &
Local Government Permanent Secretary Steven Kagoda
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government
Ministry of Public Service Officials
Principle Accountant in Prime Minister’s Office

Source: Major Media Houses in Uganda
The Ibrahim Foundation (2011) index on corruption in bureaucracy ranked Uganda
among the worst performers in this category with a score of 28.6 compared to Rwanda for
instance with a score of 57.1 in 2010/2011 (Ibrahim Foundation, 2011). Considering corruption
in government and public officials both elected and appointed, a dimension that assesses the
level of vested cronyism in, and corruption of, public officials, Uganda’s performance again
leaves a lot to be desired. When compared to Africa’s best performers, say, Botswana and
Mauritius and as well as Uganda’s neighbors Tanzania and Rwanda in the year 2010/2011,
Uganda’s performance is rated as “poor”, an indication of how leaders are at the fore front of
embezzling government resources ( Inspector General of Government, 2011)
Figure 2: Corruption in government and of Public Officials

1 CHOGM is an abbreviated form for “Commonwealth Heads of States meeting”
2 OPM refers to “Office of the Prime Minister”
60
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Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2011
Districts creation in Uganda as opposed to extending services closer to the rural people,
has been to widen Museveni’s political patronage net (Green, 2010; Crook, 2003). Uganda had a
total of 33 districts in 1986 when President Museveni came to power. This number had grown to
114 districts by 2010 and considering that there were only 56 districts in 2002 (MoLG, 2013),
the rest have normally come as promises on the eve of election years. “As noted in Acholi Times
article on July 16th 2012, creation of districts signifies jobs, council allowances, and new
Members of Parliament plus bureaucrats’ salaries with more control over resources”. Mwenda
and Tangiri (2005) concur that “state elites have dispensed government controlled economic
resources such as jobs, credits, licenses, contracts social services to select groups and persons
whose support they wished to secure.” Through such a structure, the ruling party keeps its
supporters happy and the network running.
The economic and political marginalization of Northern Uganda and the subsequent
development of the south and west have been given a patronage connotation. As the south and
the west were experiencing economic, political and social transformation, the North has been
ravaged by unending conflict of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Government’s lack of commitment
to end this war was attributed to (1) desire to suffocate and punish the North for not supporting
Museveni’s regime (Boehm, 2011), and (2) prolonging this war was for purposes of rewarding
Museveni’s military leaders (Mwenda and Tangiri, 2005), thanks to Ministry of Defense’s
classified budgets. As a result, Northern Uganda has lagged behind due to decades of fighting
until 2005 leaving Northern Uganda impoverished (UBOS, 2010).
Thus, politically led patronage right from the executive to the lower street level
bureaucrats has crippled civil service performance and its ability to deliver services efficiently
prompting resentment by the general population. The influence of higher officials in the
functioning of institutions not only exacerbates the already weak institutional capacity, but also
affects the intended contribution of these institutions to service provision. Andrew M. Mwenda
in his blog on April 13th 2013 made this description of President Museveni, “our president will
tolerate a lot of things- public officials who loot the treasury with impunity, incompetent
61
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ministers and civil servants who delay dams and roads or build substandard or ghost hospitals
and schools……however if anything posed an existential threat to his power, Museveni will be
quick, uncompromising and decisive”3. This is a clear indication of how far the Ugandan
leadership is willing to go to ensure its continued stay in power.
The Failure of Anti-Corruption Efforts “Fighting a Losing Battle”
The burgeoning of corruption in Uganda is not due to lack of effort to fighting it but the complex
system that allows those involved to go scot-free. Uganda’s political machinery benefits off
corruption and sees the fight against corruption as one that can bring about its own downfall. As
put by Mwenda, “President Museveni co-opts powerful elites from Uganda’s different religious
and ethnic factions and by giving them positions of power, privilege, and influence in
government, he is able to create a bridge between himself and their followers”4. This way,
Museveni has used his unlimited powers to create a “more personal, patronage-based, executivecentered and military reliant regime” (International Crisis Group, 2012)
Uganda’s large institutional framework for anti-corruption that includes the Inspector
General of Government’s (IGG), the anti-corruption court, the Criminal Investigation
Department under the police, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI), the Public
Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, the Auditor General (AG), and the Public
Accounts Committee of Parliament have all been side stepped (Tangiri and Mwenda, 2006;
Inspector General of Government, 2011). As reflected on the research framework, the central
government through patronage heavily influences the activities of the anti-corruption institutions
by protecting those under its network. This leaves the IGG for instance unable to prosecute those
with connection to the central government (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2009; Global
Integrity, 2011). In essence, these anti-corruption institutions will only peruse individual of no
interest to the central government. As a result, such institutions have lost credibility and public
trust to come true on their objective of fighting corruption.
According to global integrity, Uganda has the largest “implementation gap” of all the
countries covered in the report (Global Integrity, 2007). The implementation gap metric is used
to capture the gap between a country’s anti-corruption laws and the actual enforcement of those
same laws. Uganda’s legal framework for anti-corruption was ranked as “excellent” (98%);
however, enforcement of this same framework was ranked as “very poor” (51%). In fact, as long
as corrupt officials remain loyal to the president and the ruling party, there is very little chance of
concrete action ever being taken against them. This is a clear indication of how patronage has
seized the activities and decision making of the anti-corruption institutions to ensure its survival.
According to World Bank, the perceived growing culture of impunity for grand
corruption has limited the effectiveness of Anti-Corruption measure (World Bank, 2011). The
2006 Freedom House report denounced the wide spread patronage and corruption in

3 http://andrewmwendasblog.blogspot.kr/2013/04/what-keeps-museveni-in-power.html
4 http://andrewmwendasblog.blogspot.kr/2012/08/ugandas-anti-corruption-rituals.html
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government5. Corruption has become an accepted way of life in Uganda (Maraka, 2009), to the
extent that anyone appointed or elected to public office wants to take advantage of their
appointment to enrich themselves. This only serves to show that much as Uganda has a variety of
institutions mandated to fight corruption with a good legal basis from which to execute their
duties, the decisions on who to prosecute lie outside these institutions and thus the large
implementation gap.
Table 2: Percentage of prosecution cases involving public corruption which resulted in a conviction
Result of cases
2009 % 2010 % 2011 %
Conviction

2

33

15

38.5

44

31.2

Withdrawal

2

33

9

23.1

10

7.1

Dismissed

0

0

11

28.2

43

30.5

Acquitted

1

17

4

10.3

15

10.6

Closed administratively

0

0

0

0

24

17

Other (Order delivered)

0

0

0

0

5

3.6

Not stated
Total completed

1
6

17
100

0
39

0
100

0
141

0
100

Ongoing cases
Percentage resolved cases that
required more than 12 months

2

-

49

-

130

-

-

0

2 5.1

14 8.5

Source: Anti-corruption Court, 2009-2011

The trend in conviction of prosecution cases at the anti-corruption court shows a
declining rate. By 2011 for instance, while 30.5% of cases resulted into dismissals, 10.6% were
acquitted and 7.1% withdrawn, revealing the difficulties and interferences experienced in
acquiring evidence especially in cases involving high level government officials. Where
evidence has been more than compelling to warrant conviction, the IGG for instance without
giving any reason, would abandon the case. Thus, just like in the colonial days when institutions
catered for the interests of the British colonial administration, today’s anti-corruption
enforcement agencies indirectly exist for the benefit of the state’s political machine.
Consequently, majority of these convictions (31.2%) in 2011 are a reflection of cases involving
low ranking bureaucrats without political connections.
Lack of political will has commonly featured as a cause for failure of anti-corruption
efforts (Brinkerhoff, 2000; Johnston, 2005, 11; Kpundeh, 1998; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell,
2010). This however shouldn’t be a problem in the face of strong institutions, for it’s the duty of
such institutions to fight off such interference by making sure that rules are applied to everyone
impartially. Nonetheless, in the case of Uganda, the ailing nature of institutions has enabled
corrupt officials to instead hide behind these same institutions and despite President Museveni
constantly waging numerous wars against corruption, his rhetoric has not translated into credible
action making the fight against corruption an impossible one. On this note, Johnston argues that,
5 (http://www.freedomhouse.org
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“weak institutions not only allow citizens and officials to seek elicit gains, at times with
impunity; but also create incentives for more corruption as people seek protection in an uncertain
environment” (Johnston, 2005, 38)
To this end, regardless of the continued availability of resources to fight corruption
especially from the international community, corruption in Uganda has continued to thrive
(Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010; Transparency International, 2006; 2010)6. This has made
donors to threaten tough action inform of suspending aid disbursements until government takes
credible measures against those involved in corruption. Even then nothing seems fruitful as
political elites and bureaucrats protected by the patronage network continue to embezzle public
funds and manipulate reforms to reproduce patronage and other practices that help them stay in
power (Mwenda and Tangiri, 2005). Therefore unless anti-corruption institutions independently
exercise their authority and overcome the web of patronage, the fight against corruption will
always be a losing battle.
Effects of Corruption on Ugandan Poor
Ugandan government channels resources to the grassroots through the decentralization process
(Bashaasha, Mangheni, and Nkonya, 2011). Unfortunately, local governments in Uganda, the
highest being the district simply provide another layer of bureaucracy for misuse and capture of
public funds by local government politicians and bureaucrats (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004), or
call it the “decentralization of corruption”. According to Transparency International (2008)’s
corruption perception index, rampant corruption jeopardizes the fight against poverty. Thus
corruption has a direct bearing on the persistent levels of poverty (Chetwynd, Chetwynd,
Spector, 2003). It is therefore no wonder that poverty has remained a bedfellow of most
Ugandans with 62.9 per cent living on $2 a day (World Bank, 2013)
The World Bank estimates that Uganda receives over 16% in direct official funding
annually as development assistance. For instance in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the country received
USD 1,641,470,000, 1,784,700,000 and 1,723,470,000 in aid respectively (World Bank, 2013).
Unfortunately the poverty head count still stands at 24.5% ($1.25), and 62.9% ($2) below the
poverty line. The main contributing element to this level of poverty has been corruption due to
lack of transparency and citizens participation in development process. In his concept of
“Official Moguls”, a concept of “reach out and squeeze someone”, Michael Johnston categorizes
Uganda among the official moguls, a group of nations where powerful politicians and their
favorites hold all the cards, and essentially, “few individuals take over and own everything”
(Johnston, 2005). Indeed this is a perfect profile that fits Uganda’s situation considering that 50.7
percent of income is held by the top 20 percent of the population and a majority 62.9 percent
earns only $ 2 a day (World Bank, 2013).
Corruption in Uganda being politically motivated has resulted into government’s inability
to govern its citizens effectively. The inability of political institutions to reach out to citizens and
give responsive services has seriously hindered the quantity and quality of public services
consequently affecting the poor who mostly depend on them (Chetwynd, Chetwynd, and

6 www. transparency.org/cpi
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Spector, 2003). In other words corruption increases poverty through its influence on governance.
Consequently, this explains why sectors such as health are given lower priority than say defense
where budgets are classified and thus easy to misuse.
At the broadest level, corruption has brought inefficiencies in public expenditure by
diverting resources to easily corruptible sectors and has distorted the allocation of resources and
policy decisions (Hite, 2006). It basically “aggravates the living conditions of the poor people by
distorting the entire decision making process connected to public sector programs”. In 2012, the
office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Public Service lost 60 billion Uganda Shillings
(around $22 million) and 360 billion Uganda Shillings (around $131 million) respectively to
corruption (Mwenda 2013). The biggest percentage of this money was mostly allocated for
different projects and services related to the general public and considering that the poor are
most dependent on government services, is fair to say that corruption of this kind indeed affects
poverty reduction efforts further complicating their already difficult situation.
Conclusion and Recommendations
All said and done, the implementation of a strong legal and institutional framework for
anticorruption in Uganda has faced many challenges with recent developments casting doubt on
government’s commitment and sincerity to address corruption. It is therefore not a surprise that
despite Global Integrity ranking Uganda strongly in terms of the quality of her anti-corruption
law, the ranking was “very weak” in terms of enforcing this law (Global Integrity, 2009).
As shown in the discussions above, this institutional weakness emanated from the British
colonial system, which designed its administrative system to reward those who supported its
interests. The Ugandan elites groomed by this system chose to stick with the same system upon
the attainment of independence. This practice has had a great bearing on how institutions in
Uganda fight both patronage and corruption with politicians in high political offices exerting
their influence on the activities of anti-corruption institutions. The lack of independence of
especially the Inspector General of Government has seen several high ranking government
officials off the hook despite embezzling huge sums of public funds. Thus while other “countries
have made fighting corruption and provision of public services through impartial institutions the
cornerstone of their administrative authenticity, ruling elites in Uganda have made trading
patronage among themselves the fulcrum of democratic politics”7.
Owing to the above discussion, this study argues that corruption in Uganda has been
systematic and intentioned by those in power as a rewarding system to the loyal and supportive
elites of the ruling party, something that has become a culture at all levels. The tight grip held by
political elites upon the activities of the anti-corruption institutions has made it impossible to
fight patronage and corruption leaving the poor who mostly depend on government struggling to
even fulfill the basic of needs. In this way, it is plausible to say that corruption undermines
political development, flourishing where national institutions and guarantees of economic rights
are weak. And much as corruption doesn’t explain all that is wrong in Ugandan society, it surely
does negate all that is right in it and thus an indication of a deeper malady in need of urgent

7 http://andrewmwendasblog.blogspot.kr/2012/12/graft-thinking-out-of-box.html
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attention.
Unless anti-corruption institutions win back the legitimacy and support of the public in
doing the job for which they were established to do, there is completely no reason for such
institutions to be trusted in the fight against corruption. In the meantime, this study proposes
citizen led interventions that are completely out of the reach of the political machine. This can
take the form of widening and protecting citizens’ political involvement in national aspects that
directly affect them. This can reduce their susceptibility to exploitation; boost their ability to
effectively participate in politics and be able to check on the self-interested behavior of political
elites and bureaucrats who make and implement policies respectively. When achieved,
maintaining a steady patronage network with the needed discretion will be becomes difficult for
corrupt officials curtailing the network in the process.
Additionally, in Uganda where majority of the people have less access to information, the
media and civil society can play a crucial role by exposing corrupt officials yet at the same time
pointing out the options available to the public to take action in such matters that directly affect
them. The media and civil society many not only expose corrupt official but can also take lead in
agitating for institutional reforms aimed at giving a platform on which citizens’ views regarding
the running and management of public offices is done. This way, both the media and civil society
can act as mediators between the government and its citizens in ensuring public finances are
handled with respect and put towards proper use. These and more can open up the government
and in the process reduce the discretion that makes it possible for government officials to divert
public resources for their own benefits.
References
African Peer Review Mechanism. (2009). "Annual Progress Report Uganda". Kampala: http://aprmau.org/document/annual-progress-report-no-1-uganda-npoa-2008-9.
Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1997). "The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and some New
Results". Journal of Political Studies, 45, no 3, 496-515. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00093.
Anderi Shleiferand Robery Vishny (1993). "Corruption". The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no 3,
599-617. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118402 .
Andrew M. Mwenda Roger Tangiri (2005). "Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime
Consolidation in Uganda". African Affairs 104, no 416, 449-467. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adi030.
Anna Perssonand Bo Rothstein (2010). "The failure of Anti-Corruption Policies: A Theoretical
Mischaracterization of the Problem". QoG Working Paper Series 2010:19, pp. ISSN 1653-8919.
Bamber Gascoigne (2001). History World. Retrieved from History of Uganda:
http://www.historyworld.net/
Bardham Pranab (1997). "Corruption and development: A Review of Issues". Journal of Economic
Literature, 35, no 3, 1320-1346. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2729979.
Bernard Bashaasha, Margeret Najjingo and Ephraim Nkonya (2011). "Decentralization and rural serivce
delivery in Uganda". IFPRI Discussion Paper 01063. International Food Policy Research
Institute. http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01063.pdf.
Boehm Sophia (2011). "The politics of American Aid and Conflict in Northern Uganda". Insights, 5. no
1, 3-34.
Bratsis Peter (2003) "Corrupt Compared to What? Greece, capitalist interests, and the specular purity of
the state. Discussion Paper No. 8. Hellenic Observatory: London School of Economics and
Political Science.

66

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2015

13

African Social Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 [2015], Art. 4

Brinkerhoff Derrick (2000). "Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts:An analytical
Framework". Public Administration and Development.Vol 20, Isuue 3, 239-252. DOI:
10.1002/1099-162X(200008).
Crook Richard (2003). "Decentralization and poverty reduction in Africa: The politics of local - central
relations". Journal of Public Administration and Development, 23, no1, 77-88. DOI:
10.1002/pad.261.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnston and James Robinson (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation". The American Economic Review, 91, no. 5, 13691401. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677930.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. (2002). "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and
Institutions in the making of the Modern World Income Distribution". The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117, no.4, 1231-1294. doi:10.1162/003355302320935025.
Deflem Mathieu. (1995). "Corruption, Law and Justice: A Conceptual Clarification". Journal of Criminal
Justice, 23, no.3, 243-258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2352(95)00018-L.
Englebert Pierre (2000). "Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in
Tropical Africa". Political Research Quarterly, 53. no. 1, 7-36.
Eric Chetwynd Francis Chetwynd and Bertram Spector (2003). "Corruption and Poverty: A Review of
Recent Literature". Washington, DC: Management Systems International.
Fukuyama Francis (2012). Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law "The Two Europes". The
American
Interest.
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/05/08/the-twoeuropes/.
Global Integrity (2007). "Global Integrity Report: Opportunities and Challenges in the Fight Aganist
Corruption". Washington DC: Global Integrity.
Global Integrity (2009). "Uganda: 2009 Assessment". Washington: Global Integrity.
Global Integrity (2011). "Uganda integrity scorecard". Washington DC:
http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Uganda/2011.
Green Elliot. (2010). "Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda". Studies in Comparative
International Development, 45, no 1, 83-103. DOI 10.1007/s12116-009-9058-8.
Gupta, Sanjeev. Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme. (2002) Does Corruption affect income
inequality and poverty?". Economics of Governance 3, no 1, 23-45. doi10.1007/s101010100039.
Heckert Tessa (2011). Government Corruption- Roman Time Machine.
http://prezi.com/iaua_idcdo6_/government-corruption-roman-time-machine/.
Hite Nancy (2006). "Measuring Regional Variation of Corruption Induced Inefficiency in Public Roads
Construction, using German Data".
http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/recent_papers/nancygermanyreplication.pdf.
Inge Amundsen, Tone Sissener and Tina Soreode. (2000). "Research on Corruption: A Policy Oriented
Survey". Oslo: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) & Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
http://www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution07_andvig.pdf.
International Crisis Group (2012). "Uganda: No resolution to growing tensions". Nairobi/Brussels:
International Crisis Group. Africa Report No 187.
Inspector General of Government (2011). "Second Annual Report on Corruption Trends in Uganda:
Using the data tracking mechanism". Kampala: Inspectorate of Government, Republic of Uganda.
Johnston Michael (1997). "Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: Connections
between Politics and Corruption". In K. A. (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (pp. 61-82).
Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. http://www.iie.com/.
Johnston Michael (2005, 11). "Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy". New York:
Cambridge University Press.

67

http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/assr/vol7/iss1/4

14

Godfrey and Jun Yu: Patronage driven corruption undermining the fight against povert

http://www.untagsmd.ac.id/files/Perpustakaan_Digital_1/CORRUPTION%20Syndromes%20of%
20Corruption.pdf.
Kaufmann Daniel (2011). "Corruption: the facts". Retrieved from Governance and Anti-corruption: The
World Bank Group. http://go.worldbank.org/VKLPH4ZYX0
Kempe Ronald Hope (2000). "Corruption and development in Africa". In e. K. Chikulo, Corruption and
development in Africa (pp. 17-38). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Kpundeh Sahr. J. (1998). "Political will in fighting corruption". In I. H. Sahr J. Kpundeh, Corruption and
Integrity Improvement initiatives in Developing Countries (pp. 91-110). Paris: UNDP/OECD.
Lui Francis. T (2007). "Three Aspects of Corruptions". Contemporary Economic Policy Vol 14, no 3, 2629. DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1996.tb00621.x.
Maraka Emmanuel (2009). The Role of Patronage in Shaping Uganda's Economic, Social and Political
Spheres. Retrieved from Hivos Knowledge Programme: http://www.hivos.net/Hivos-KnowledgeProgramme/Themes/Pluralism/Countries/Uganda/Resources/The-role-of-patronage-in-shapingUganda-s-economic-social-and-political-spheres
Mathew Lange, James Mahoney and Vom Hau((2006). "Colonialism ans Development: A comparative
analysis of Spanish and British Colonies". American Journal of Sociology, 111, no 5, 1412-62.
DOI: 10.1086/499510.
Mauro Paolo (1998). "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure". Journal of Public
Economics 69, no 2, 263-279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00025-5.
Mbaku John Makum (1998). Corruption and Rent-Seeking. In e. S. Paldam, The Political Dimension of
Economic Growth (pp. 193-211). Palgrave Online Economics Library.
http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/borner.htm.
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2011). "Ibrahim Index of African Governance). London, England: Mo Ibrahim
Foundation.
MoLG (2013). "Local governments in Uganda". Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Local Government.
http://www.molg.go.ug/local-governments.
Moncrieffe Joy (2004). Uganda's Political Economy: A sythesis of major thought. Kampala: GSDRC.
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DOC44.pdf.
Museveni Yoweri (1992). What is Africa's problem? Kampala: NRM Publications.
Mwenda Andrew (2013). Fighting Corruption in Uganda. The scandals of OPM and the ministry of public
service show a breakdown of the government's financial management system. The Independent.
Mwenda Andrew and Roger Tangiri (2001). "Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda's Privatization in the
1990's". African Affairs, 100, 117-133. doi: 10.1093/afraf/100.398.117.
Mwenda Andrew and Roger Tangiri (2011). "Elite Corruption and politics in Uganda". Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics, 46, no.2, 177-149. DOI:10.1080/14662040802005336.
Negin Vahideh, Rashid Zakariah, and Nikopour Hesam (2010). "The Causal Relationship between
Corruption and Poverty: A Panel Data Analysis". MPRA Paper no.24871, 23-38. Munich
Personal RePEc Archive. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24871/.
Nisbet Robert and Robert K. Merton (1961, 92). "Contemporary Social Problems: An introduction to the
Sociology of Diviant Behavior and Social Disorganization". New York: Harcourt, Brace World
publications.
Pope Jeremy (2000). "TI Source Book". Berlin: Transparency
International.http://www.transparency.org.nz/docs/2000/Elements-of-a-National-IntegritySystem.pdf.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1999). "The Quality of
Government". Law, Economics, & Organization 15, no 1, 222-279. doi: 10.1093/jleo/15.1.222.

68

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2015

15

African Social Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 [2015], Art. 4

Rothstein Bo and Jan Teorell (2008). "What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Political
Institutions". Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions.
21, no 2 (The Quality of Government Institute), 165-190. DOI: 10.1111/j.14680491.2008.00391.x.
Roger Tangiri and Andrew Mwenda (2006). "Politics, donors and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption
institutions in Uganda". The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44. no1, 101-124. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X05001436.
Ruzindana Augustine (1997, 134). "The importance of leadership in fighting corruption in Uganda'. In K.
A. (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy (pp. 133-146). Washington DC: Institute for
International economics.
Steidlmeier Paul (1999). "Gift Giving, Bribery and Corruption: Ethical Management of Business Relation
in China". Journal of Business Ethics, 20. no. 2, 121-132.
Svensson Ritva Reinikka Jakob (2004). "Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer
Program in Uganda". Quarterly Journal of Economics,119, no 2, 679-705. doi:
10.1162/0033553041382120.
Tanzi Vito (1998). "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures". IMF
Working Paper 98/63. Interntional Monetary Fund.
Titeca Kristoff (2006). "Political Patronage and Political Values: The Developmental Role of Political
Patronage and its Impacts on Shaping Political Values in Rural Uganda". Afika Focus 19, Nr 1-2,
pp. 43-67. ISSN 0772-084X.
Transparency International (2006). "Corruption Perception Index". Berlin, Germany: Transparency
International. http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006.
Treiman Daniel (2000). "The Causes of Corruption: Across National Study". Public Economics 76, no 3,
399-457. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4.
UBOS (2010). "Statistical Abstract". Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2010StatAbstract.pdf.
UBOS (2011). "Statistical Abstruct". Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistiics.
Ward Kevin (1991). "A History of Christianity in Uganda'. In (. Zablon Nthamburi, 'From Mission to
Church: A Handbook of Christianity in East Africa" (pp. 81-144). Nairobi: Uzima press.
Retrieved from A History of Christianity in Uganda:
http://www.dacb.org/history/a%20history%20of%20christianity%20in%20uganda.html
Williams Robert. J (1981). "Political Corruption in the United States". Political Studies 29, no 1, 126-129.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1981.tb01282.x .
World Bank (1997). "Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management". New York: The World Bank Group.
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/coridx.htm.
World Bank (2011). "Uganda: Growing out of Poverty". Retrieved from Poverty Reduction and Equity:
http://go.worldbank.org/HRGOOV0EK0
World Bank (2013). The World Bank. Retrieved from Net Official Development Assistance and Official
Aid Received : http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD

Mbabazi Godfrey is a PhD candidate in the Graduate School of Government and Business at
Yonsei University Wonju Campus, South Korea. Under the supervision of Dr. Pyeong Jun Yu,
he has successfully finished defending his dissertation on the perceived impact of the Electronic
government upon the Quality of government. His research interests are Electronic government
and the Quality of government. Email: ezrah9@yahoo.com
69

http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/assr/vol7/iss1/4

16

Godfrey and Jun Yu: Patronage driven corruption undermining the fight against povert

Pyeong Jun Yu is a professor of Global Public Administration and the Director of
Master's Degree Program on Community Development Leadership at Yonsei University
Wonju Campus. His research interests are in public management, electronic government,
and global leadership training. His recently published articles are "Social and Solidarity
Economy (SSE) Principle in Development: A Comparative Analysis of Rural Development
Programs in Ghana and South Korea" and "Analysis on E-Participation Research Trend in
Korea." Email: pjyu@yonsei.ac.kr

70

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2015

17

